Introduction
British colonial intervention in natural resources management in India can be described as a combination of a long-drawn act of appropriation by dispossession and an extended process of creation of new state and private property rights. For forests, the establishment of the colonial, and independent, state"s property claims over feudal for the intellectual purposes of this special issue, but also for practical Indian policy reasons.
As suggested above, no private property rights in surface water for canal irrigation exist in India in a way comparable with land as private property. However, there are, as will be shown, clearly defined legal entitlements to water for individual canal irrigators. These are not generally talked about as "rights", but they have been treated as such by individual irrigators in certain circumstances and periods.
Despite the clear and legal status of these entitlements they have, at present, little practical relevance for actually existing canal water distribution. Canal irrigation infrastructure has been designed technically to reflect these entitlements, and in that sense sets physical boundary conditions (notably canal capacities) for water distribution.
However, the operational rules (cf. Ostrom 1990) for that distribution have emerged, over time, in repeated seasonal and yearly cycles of distribution practices, quite independently from the formal legal rule set. These rules reproduce patterns of unequal water distribution, and co-exist with other canal irrigation "performance problems" like yield gaps (agricultural productivity below potential) and poor cost recovery (water fee collection rates between 2 and 8% (PC/GOI 2013:151) make canal irrigation a heavily subsidised sector).
This situation raises a number of questions relevant to the theme of this special issue.
Why do the legally defined entitlements to canal water for individual
irrigators not carry more weight in practice? It will be shown that this is not due to lack of clarity or fuzziness of their legal status, but to systemic characteristics of Indian governance and politics as these have developed post-independence. Gangetic plains in the north, and in the deltas in the south (Whitcombe 1972; Stone 1984; Wallach 1985) . It gained further momentum in response to the famines of the second part of the 19 th century (Famine Commission 1880 , 1881 , 1898 . Public Works
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Departments and Engineering Colleges were established in this period -canal irrigation professionalised. The Report of the Indian Irrigation Commission 1901-03 is a landmark document as regards the establishment of colonial irrigation policy. By the end of the colonial era 13.57 million ha of canal irrigation had been constructed (Mollinga 2003, 59; GOI/MOIP 1972, 261) .
The property rights situation with regard to surface water that emerged out of the colonial process is one where the state is formally the owner of all surface water resources, and the chief allocator of it (Upadhyay 2009; see also Cullet 2009, 40-1) . In India, river flows are allocated by the state for different uses in yearly quantitative volumes, with the allocations having a long-term validity of several decades. 3 For example, the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal irrigation system that is the main case example of this paper has a yearly allocation of 100 TMCft (thousand million cubic feet) under the Krishna river "award" (the Tungabhadra being a tributary of Krishna).
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The (colonial and independent) state"s assumption of the overall ownership of the natural resource water meant that it could assume the role of a developmental state. It vested the authority in itself to implement large scale infrastructural works to re-arrange (1) the warabandi system in the north (notably present day Haryana, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh),
(2) the block system in the west (notably present day Maharashtra), and (3) the localisation system (present day Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu).
These allocation systems defined entitlements to irrigation water in different ways. The northern warabandi system worked on a time-share basis, allocating hours+minutes of available flow per unit area of irrigable land, with farmers free to choose their crops (Malhotra 1982; Narain 2003) . The western block system attempted to introduce measured volumetric supply to groups of farmers cultivating "blocks" with one-third high water consuming sugarcane as a cash crop, and two-thirds low water (Bolding et al. 1995) . The southern localisation system was the most strongly prescriptive variant of allocation. It prescribed for each irrigable cadastral unit which crop could be grown in which season, and how much water was to be supplied for that (Mollinga 2003) .
The rationing challenge
Common to the three systems is that they involve the demarcation of land that is allowed to be irrigated (and thus, simultaneously, land that is excluded from irrigation), and allocation of water in relation to the size of the holding, showing the connection of water rights/entitlements to land. All three allocation systems have as their main characteristic and challenge that they ration water. In the so called protective irrigation systems that were constructed in the low rainfall regions, farmers are not entitled for irrigation of full crop water requirements (which would maximise the crop"s yield), but they are allocated a part of these full-growth requirements for supplementary irrigation.
Protective irrigation systems aim to spread water thinly over large areas and numbers of farmers, supplying only part of the total water needs of crops. This is in contrast to systems that supply full crop water requirements -examples of this being the delta and some river systems built in South India in the colonial period for rice cultivation.
9
Protective irrigation, in theory, protects crops against failure, farmers against famine/poverty and optimises overall (rather than individual) output (maximising "crop per drop").
10
9 For the concepts of protective and productive irrigation, see Mollinga (2003, chapter 3) .
10 For the economics of this, see Mitra (1986) , Rath and Mitra (1989) and Dhawan (1988 Dhawan ( , 1989 (4)).
Fines were attached to both, which to this day are administered and calculated in long lists of survey numbers per village for every irrigation season. Also, canal water release schedules are to this day calculated based on the localisation schedule (that is, the assumed areas and crops inform the water flows to be released into different canals (and originally, in the design and building phase, informed the dimensions of the canals as such).
In all three regions mentioned, the practice of distribution differs substantially from the formal rationing schedule. The basic issue is that the logic of the collective optimum contradicts the logic of the individual optimum. While rationing water may maximise overall production and reduce risk for the largest number of people, and increase their livelihood security, for an individual farmer it makes sense to appropriate additional water for higher yields in more than one season. The one-season water use of an "irrigated dry" crop as prescribed in the Tungabhadra LBC localisation scheme, and the two seasons of wet rice farming that farmers practice when they get a chance, differ season to avoid such manipulation, petitions and lobbying, road blockades, demonstrations and sit-ins, and several other things), that drama is structured by, sometimes highly sophisticated, rules. Water distribution rules exist at three levels, which I discuss in the next section.
Access relations in the Tungabhadra LBC
In this section I discuss the rules that have been designed, over time, for daily water distribution in the Tungabhadra LBC, in response to the inefficacy of the localisation schedule. The three levels of rules are those at the level of the local irrigation unit, those at the level of the secondary canals (the canals that link the main canal that takes water from the Tungabhadra reservoir with the local irrigation units), and those at the level of the main canal. The descriptions are brief, for details see Mollinga (2003, chapters 6, 7 and 9). The description is followed by a presentation of the structure of social relations that underpins unequal water distribution.
Farmer designed rotation schedules in local units
Local irrigation units are areas of roughly 50 to 150 acres (20 to 60 hectares) in size, in which several tens of farmers have land. Such a unit receives water from the government managed canal system through an "outlet", a structure with a pipe that can be closed with a steel gate. Government managers have no formal responsibility "below the outlet"; this is the domain where farmers distribute water among themselves, making use of field channels that convey water from the outlet structure to individual plots head-tail pattern, was the general observation in the areas and seasons with insufficient water for 100% rice cultivation. The basic mechanism explaining this paradox (of equity based rules with unequal outcomes) was located in the planting of low-water consuming crops by small farmers in anticipation of losing water distribution conflicts with large farmers in peak demand periods (for dependency relations between the two classes of farmers see below). Water conflicts where thus displaced to crop choice, with the more water consuming crops being the more remunerative crops.
Government-elite farmers negotiated rules at secondary canal level
Local irrigation units are situated along secondary canals, in a queue from the upstream side, where water enters the secondary canal from the main (or primary) canal, till the downstream end, where the secondary canal usually empties in a natural drain.
Secondary canals are formally managed by the irrigation agency and farmers are supposed not to be involved in the delivery of water through local unit outlets.
However, the secondary canals are a main site of farmer activity "above the outlet". A key aspect of water access is securing a regular and sufficient supply to one"s local unit.
For this purpose local unit groups have organised for "external action" in order to secure such supply. This involves collection of money (often area-wise) to cover costs for lobbying the irrigation agency officials and local politicians, the employment of labour to guard outlets along the canal in peak periods of water demand (to control excess appropriation upstream and to avoid blocking by downstream farmers of one"s own outlet gate), and to appoint larger, well-placed and capable farmers as outlet representatives, for engaging in day-to-day water distribution conflicts along the secondary canal as well as for interacting with officials and politicians in their offices Implementation of the rotation schedules, often formally announced by the irrigation agency and printed on pamphlets, and mobilised in peak periods of demand when informal mediation no longer works, in principle happens by the irrigation agency staff, particularly during the day. At night farmers "implement" by manipulating and guarding outlet gates. When conflicts escalate, the irrigation agency also undertakes night guarding activities by patrolling the canal. The schedules negotiated between the agency and the local leadership of elite farmers consolidate a pattern of unequal head to tail distribution, in which there is some balance found between efforts to push water as far down the canal as possible and local power equations. They are an institutional tool for arranging a somewhat predictable water supply schedule in water scarce periods 15 .
Internal rules in the irrigation agency at main canal level
The main (primary) canal that takes water from the reservoir created by the 
3.4.The social relations of unequal water distribution
The rules at these three levels constitute the concretely existing "access relations" for irrigation water. The rules are "functional" in the sense that they are instrumental in reproducing a particular pattern of water distribution. This is a highly unequal pattern in the Tungabhadra LBC case, hence their repeated (dramatic) contestation every irrigation season. In this sense, these rules, which effectively redefine the legal entitlements as embodied in the localisation schedule in a spatially and thereby socially skewed pattern, are "credible". They are actively mobilised by managers and users in conducting water distribution. 16 The rule systems are coping strategies that reduce the transaction costs of water distribution, even when their being in a constant state of subversion and (re)negotiation makes the rules fragile. Their apparent relative endurance over time could be described, following Ho"s introduction to this issue, as the expression of a Progressive Disequilibrium. The endurance of rule systems that reproduce, in this case, inequality needs to be understood as the expression of and upheld by a particular power balance and social logic, which is summarised in Figure 1 . This situation is similar to the one described by Ho on the Grazing Ban in China (see this volume).
17
16 Note that in this case the "credibility" of the actually existing rule system has no positive normative connotations (as the word"s synonyms like trustworthiness, standing, sincerity and believability may suggest). The use of the rule system is pragmatic -many water users are still worse off than they should be according to formal rules, and this is a felt injustice.
17 It can also be noted that the coexistence of a formal, legal allocation plus set of rules, and the rules of actually existing access, do not constitute a case of "legal pluralism" in the classical sense of two rule systems that are alternatively mobilised depending on situations and actors at hand. The formal, legal system is rarely called upon (anymore) for solving water distribution problems (though reproduced for other reasons), while actually existing access Wade"s (1982 Wade"s ( , 1985 analysis of the system of administrative and political corruption. Indian government officials are regularly transferred, and for securing or avoiding certain transfers, or sometimes for staying in position, government officials need to make payments to politicians. They source the funds for these payments primarily from the budget for the physical works (maintenance and construction) for the irrigation system they work in. The third set of relations that the elite farmers maintain are with the small and poor peasants in their area. Elite farmers also are major employers of local labour, and frequently act as local moneylenders, thus creating dependency relations with the group of small and poor peasants. These small and poor peasants have some limited leverage in this relationship as voters being mobilised as part of an elite "vote bank". To reproduce the political support that elite farmers require for the exertion of their leadership, they, among other things, share a part of the excess/extra water they secure with small and poor peasants. 19 The agency of small and poor peasants depends, apart from the features of labour and credit markets, on competition between different elite sections; the irrigation department officials" room to manoeuvre similarly consist in the fact that there are a series of local elites located on different sections along the canal that are competing for water. The simplified structure presented here does thus not produce simple, linear social processes and outcomes, but structures a highly dynamic process of contestation.
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The role of water rights in unequal distribution in the Tungabhadra LBC
Based on this description of actually existing water distribution practices in the Tungabhadra LBC case, I offer two reflections that qualify the contribution of property rights analysis to the understanding of unequal water distribution.
A first reflection regards the rights and access notions. The presentation in the previous section shows that farmers" water use is shaped by a set of access relations in the forms of rules at different canal levels. These rules have no direct connection with the entitlements as defined in the localisation schedule. In fact, they have emerged over time as a response to the impossibility to implement localisation"s allocation pattern.
Localisation practically only exists as a normative principle, not as an operational tool.
This situation confirms Ribot and Peluso"s (2003) argument, for local natural resource use more generally, that apart from a theory of rights, a theory of access is required. The centrality of rules crafted "in process" plus the practical irrelevance of formally defined entitlements, illustrates, strongly, their point that distribution cannot be "read off"
property rights, and that access relations need to be analysed in their own right. Thus, even when property rights would matter, they would not be the only thing that mattered given that "access" needs to be looked at separately.
A second qualification of the purchase of property rights based analysis relates to the contextuality of rights. In the case study discussion above I have carefully avoided the "rights" word and spoken as much as possible about "entitlements" instead, notwithstanding the legal status of these entitlements. There has been a period in which the localisation-defined entitlements for Tungabhadra LBC farmers were actively treated as rights by irrigators, notably by those who could not realise their entitlement to water. In the 1970s and 1980s hundreds, if not thousands, of writ petitions were registered at the High Court of Karnataka submitted by farmers who did not receive In Indian canal irrigation policy and academic discourse, entitlements to irrigation water are not generally referred to as "water rights", notwithstanding their legal anchoring. These entitlements are treated more as allocations prescribed and to be implemented by the state administration rather than as (enforceable) rights of individual farmers. Government, after all, has claimed the overall ownership of water, to be used in the public interest. This reflects the developmental state"s ambition of the first decades after independence, but Upadhyay (2009) In the footnote attached to this section he further states:
"The author feels that the ownership question in water has never been seriously addressed by policymakers and jurists despite the continuing claims and counterclaims on the part of the State and the people." (ibid., fn. 22, 143) Though formal water law is clear about the state"s claim of ownership and control, this claim is only partly felt to be legitimate by the people (irrigated farmers in the case example). This can be understood as an instance of the long-standing problematic relationship of Indian states with the populace in terms of legitimacy and accountability, including the independent democratic state. Kaviraj (1997) argues that the Western form of political democracy that India adopted after independence was an elite project implanted on Indian society "from the top", which "meant that a problem of intelligibility of the political institutions of the state remained at the heart of the Indian democratic system" (ibid., 232). A structure has been reproduced in which the state is exterior to local social dynamics, and is seen as a whimsical tyrant with which one enters into relations of patronage and which one tries to control or influence in part for one"s own benefit, but never considers as one"s own (for more discussion, see Mollinga 2010). Entitlements are treated as privileges accorded by government rather than as rights of those entitled.
Clear and unambiguous legal text cannot resolve this situation. To the contrary, this situation to an important extent annuls the force of law, while tending to produce a highly polarised form of (water) politics (Mollinga 2010). Property rights, even when clearly defined and legally enshrined, have no force by themselves: the force of legal concepts and definitions is always contextual. While at some point farmers believed that the localisation-based entitlements provided strong legal claims, and government pursued, or at least seriously discussed, a law and order approach to its implementation, this faith and conviction has disappeared in the realities of India"s competitive populist These two points, the independent status of access relations and the contextuality of law, already provide good reasons to be sceptical about explanations of unequal water distribution and other "performance problems" of canal irrigation that start from an economic theory-based primacy of property rights. The next section takes a more detailed look at economic theory-inspired discussion of canal irrigation (reform) in India and elsewhere.
Economic theory and canal irrigation (reform)
This section discusses whether or not the strengthening of the (individual private)
property status of water might be instrumental in addressing the "performance problems" of canal irrigation.
'Marketisation' inspired canal irrigation reform
The post-1990 period is not the first time that Indian canal irrigation has seen attempts to introduce (neo)liberal logics in its management. For the colonial period attempts at volumetric supply and contractual water delivery in north India have been reported by Stone (1984, 180-3) . They were abandoned in 1870. The mid-19 th century saw an attempt at private irrigation investment through the Madras Irrigation and Canal 21 The equity dimension of localisation continues to be mobilised discursively in the political sphere, the localisation schedule continues to be used to calculate formal canal release schedules at the start of the irrigation seasons, and administrative documentation of its violation is routinely produced. Localisation thus primarily has symbolic purchasearguably of declining strength. Maharashtra, which failed to establish the volumetric pricing of water (Bolding et al. 1995) .
This is
Since the early 1990s, a decade sometimes described as the age of "market triumphalism" (Peet and Watts 1993), there has been a new surge of advocacy of "marketisation" 22 of/in canal irrigation. Globally, the strongest version of this perspective was an argument for the introduction of "tradable water rights" to solve both allocation and efficiency problems in water resources management, including canal irrigation (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994) . This is a perspective that posits the need for clear and unencumbered private property in water, to allow market mechanisms to do their optimisation work: allocation of water to the use with highest economic benefits, and the constitution of incentives for efficient water use. However, there is only one southern country in which this discourse was taken to its full practical conclusion, namely Chile. In Chile, allocative and use efficiency did not result from the introduction of tradable water rights, as has been documented by Bauer (1997 Bauer ( , 2004 Bauer ( , 2015 . Efforts to expand the Chilean approach to other countries in Latin America met with great resistance, with the emblematic Cochabamba "water war" as the best known
example (Nickson and Vargas 2002).
This strong articulation of "tradable water rights" has not made it to discursive and policy prominence in Indian canal irrigation. However, a general sense of the 22 I use the term "marketisation" to (loosely) refer to the variety of approaches to canal irrigation reform that find their inspiration in economic theories focusing on the positive allocative and efficiency work that private property based markets and market(-like) mechanisms can do.
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Onlin h p prints.soas.ac.u desirability of "more market" in irrigation is present in Indian irrigation academic and policy writing. The clearest exponent of this is perhaps Saleth (1996) -a resource economist then based at the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi. He claims that "[t]he economic rationality and urgency for a water institution based on a legally-based and farmer-managed water rights system are indeed very clear and compelling" (p.271) and argues that the "institutional significance of the rights system for sustainable development emerges from the fact that it is one of those rare policy instruments that can simultaneously address three critical goals of sustainable development, i.e., ecological security, economic efficiency, and social equity" (p.272-3). This is based on continue to function as government agencies in practice, and are far removed from the concept of "self-financing irrigation bureaucracies" (Merrey, 1996) , that is, irrigation bureaucracies functioning like corporate entities having to balance their budgets, notably through fee collection from water users.
Times may be changing, however, also in this respect. A recent development in "performance problems" in canal irrigated agriculture, and 2) the increasing pressure to allocate water "out of agriculture" for urban and industrial use.
Critique of market and private property focused thinking on canal irrigation
This subsection critiques market/private property inspired thinking on canal irrigation (reform). In general, three types of critique of market/private property inspired thinking on canal irrigation (reform) can be distinguished. Two of these are of general nature, not specific for but applicable to canal irrigation.
(1) The economic theory underlying "marketisation" oriented thinking is fundamentally flawed: private property based markets cannot do the allocative and efficiency work that economic theory wants it to do.
(2) The neo-institutionalist economics perspective, like other disciplinary perspectives, is reductionist: as a partial, one-dimensional perspective it fails to capture the causal complexity of irrigation situations; the implicitly or explicitly claimed primacy of a single causal factor is unhelpful for both analysis and design of realistic reform approaches.
The first two points I treat briefly as the arguments supporting them are well known in the critical literature on markets and neoliberalism. The third critique addresses the specificity of canal irrigation, is perhaps less well known, and I discuss it in some more detail. relationship between sharecropping and access to water in Gujarat). In the Tungabhadra LBC case the explanation of unequal water distribution also has a strong element of interlocking: local water distribution is interlocked with credit and labour markets, system level water distribution is interlocked with the market for public office. The specific form of these linkages helps to explain (unequal) outcomes.
What such "fundamental" critiques of mainstream economics" understanding of market, property and price have given us is a conceptual apparatus for a much more refined understanding of how the institutions of property, market and price "really work", in a relational, multidimensional, embedded and evolutionary way. The third critique argues that the "resilience" of canal irrigation management practices to "marketisation", partly lies in the specific material and institutional characteristics of large-scale canal irrigation systems and the water that flows through them. In the context of urban water supply, Bakker (2003) has characterised water as "an uncooperative commodity". This characterisation can also be applied to canal irrigation.
Credit goes to Moore (1989) for providing the first detailed argument on this, before the "marketisation" hype of the early 1990s. He argues that "it is rarely practicable to apply scarcity pricing rigorously because of the economic and technical infeasibility of Walker 2014). The point is that a lot of "embedding" work may be required to make markets work more as envisaged in theory. The feasibility of such efforts depends on characteristics 
Conclusion: beyond property rights in water
The discussion above has shown that there is no lack of clarity in the formal definition of property rights in land, state ownership of water, and irrigators" legal entitlements to water in Indian canal irrigation, as illustrated by the Tungabhadra Left Bank Canal south Indian irrigation system. Farmers" private property rights in land are not disputed; the state"s overall ownership of water resources is legally clear, and as far as water management within canal irrigation systems is concerned, not contested 29 ; the water entitlements of individual farmers are legally and clearly enshrined in the localisation schedule. It is thus difficult to argue that insecurity in property rights lies at the basis of the "performance problems" of south Indian, and by implication other, canal irrigation systems. The discussion above vindicates Ribot and Peluso"s argument that in addition to a theory of property, a theory of access is required. At the same time, it also demonstrates the problem of the neo-liberal focus on institutional form instead of function. The institutional dimension of system performance is about the intricacies of access relations rather than property relations. Secondly, it has been shown that law (in this case, legal definitions of entitlements) is only as forceful as the context allows it to be, and that "clarity" does not constitute force by itself. In addition it has been shown that notions like property, market and price have to be "pluralised": their multiple dimensions need to be considered, in contrast to the more singular understanding of of both the existing cultural political economy and the resources management system, neither of which is, however, immutable.. as illustrated with the case example. Another addition has been that a consideration of the specific material and institutional features of canal irrigation matter for the type of institutional arrangements for water distribution that are possible -causing significant constraints to "marketisation".
It is also not easy to see how a strengthening of the legal status of individual water entitlements to explicit water rights might do much to make water distribution less unequal. Given the weakness of the legal and administrative enforcement system, the contrary is more easily imaginable. For instance, when entitlements would become tradable use rights, a further accumulation of water could possibly ensue through the same interlocked dependencies of water distribution with credit and employment that were described above. In a positive interpretation such tradable use rights might, in contrast, become a mechanism for tail-enders to receive at least some compensation for the excess upstream appropriation. However, the same systemic weakness would militate against the effective making of payment claims. I conclude that upsetting the function and credibility of existing rules systems, no matter how pragmatic they may be, and notwithstanding their role in the reproduction of unequal distribution, should be treated with care as institutions arise in an endogenous manner. This is why the intentional design of institutions as propagated in the neo-liberal paradigm should be viewed with suspicion. Changes in the formal property status of water alone are unlikely to affect existing access patterns in canal irrigation, unless accompanied by, or pa rt of, changes of power balances in the governance and management structure of canal irrigation.
